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Although the concept of solidarity sits at the center of many European health sector debates, the specific groups
eligible for coverage, the financing arrangements, and the range of services and benefits that, together, compose
the operational content of solidarity have all changed considerably over time. In prior economic periods, solidarity
covered considerably fewer services or groups of the population than it does today. As economic and political
circumstances changed, the content of solidarity changed with them. Recent examples of these shifts are illustrated
through a discussion of health reforms in Netherlands, Germany and also Israel (although not in Europe, the Israeli
health system is similar in structure to European social health insurance systems).
This article suggests that changed economic circumstances in Europe since the onset of the 2008 financial crisis may
lead to re-configuring the scope and content of services covered by solidarity in many European health systems. A key
issue for policymakers will be protecting vulnerable populations as this re-design occurs.
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The idea of solidarity has been at the center of European
health policy at least since the end of World War Two
[1]. Whether officially termed solidarity (as in social
health insurance systems and also tax-funded systems
on the Continent) or phrased as its conceptual near-
equivalent “equity” (UK) or “equality” (Nordic countries)
in Northern European tax-funded health systems, soli-
darity has long been acknowledged as a core value in
European health policy debate. Any policy proposal that
seeks to change coverage or access components within a
country’s health sector is assessed in terms of its likely
impact on solidarity, and a major element of its political
success or failure often reflects that impact.
In most of these national policy debates, participants
rarely define what is meant by that term, “solidarity”. Its
content is assumed to be understood by all, and is nor-
mally not specifically defined in public discourse or, in
some countries, even in its main health sector legisla-
tion. Such an explicit definition has seemed unnecessary,
as in most cases all sides in the political debate are com-
mitted to this core value, and reflexively re-state theirCorrespondence: rsaltma@emory.edu
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unless otherwise stated.commitment as they go forward to deal with the specific
policy issue under consideration.
The concept of solidarity used in European public de-
bate has both aspirational (philosophical) and practical
(operational) dimensions, sometimes combined in the
same statement. Historically, the concept of solidarity in
Europe has referred to “communities of mutual recogni-
tion” [1]. These typically grew out from personal (family)
to communal (churches) to occupational (guilds, unions)
and finally to national (political associations and parties)
when the state stepped in as the financial regulator and
guarantor [2]. Philosophically, a variety of attributes were
assigned to solidarity: reciprocity (asymetrical for the
needy); social cohesion; altruism and fellowship; citizen-
ship duties; universal brotherhood; political and/or social
justice [3]. Operationally, although the original self-
governing institutions of solidarity were retained when the
state took control, in practice decisions were “lifted out of
the context of mutual recognition” to become incorpo-
rated into the state’s administrative apparatus [1].
In current practice, the term solidarity has a number
of different meanings to the range of different political
actors who invoke it. To some, solidarity means that
every individual regardless of income or social standing
has the same services delivered by the same health careis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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solidarity is more focused on equal process - particularly
access to care - rather than equal clinical or health status
results. To yet a third group, solidarity refers to shared
financial sacrifice – guaranteeing that funding responsi-
bilities are acceptably distributed across a particular
group or population. In actual practice, the particular
health service content that solidarity covers - “who gets
what, when, and how” to apply Lasswell’s famous defin-
ition of politics - has varied quite considerably, depend-
ing on the political and economic era, on the country’s
norms and values, and on the particular structure of the
country’s health-related institutions [2]. These oper-
ational differences typically are subsumed within the lan-
guage of solidarity as the philosophical “touchstone” of
what is viewed as a core normative value.
This article explores the changing meaning and con-
tent of solidarity in two different European social health
insurance systems and in the similarly structured social
health insurance system in Israel. The next two sections
take a broadly historical perspective, reviewing the spe-
cific practical content of solidarity as it has evolved up
to the present period. Most (although not all) of these
changes have served to increase the overall services and
population groups covered by the collectively financed
system. The subsequent section then considers the im-
plications of Europe’s slow/no growth economies for fu-
ture health reform and the types of measures that have
been or are being considered to revise what is covered
by solidarity in their health system, this time mostly to-
ward reducing collectively covered coverage and ser-
vices. The paper concludes with a short assessment of
the implications of this reviewed experience for the con-
cept of solidarity generally.
Historical evolution of solidarity’s content
The first practitioners of solidarity were the friendly soci-
eties formed by craft workers in the Thirteenth Century in
England [4]. Over the next several centuries the concept
continued to grow in various cooperative and not-for-
profit private settings, becoming particularly associated
with industrial workers’ mutual societies and, in the latter
part of the 19th Century, the union movement [2].
By the end of the 19th Century, as more traditionalist
politicians were looking for tools to blunt the growing polit-
ical power of Marxist and/or Lassallean socialist move-
ments among factory workers, the concept of solidarity and
its collectively paid set of cross-subsidized health benefits
took more comprehensive shape. Through this political
process, the concept – and practical benefit content – of
solidarity as a central function and objective of collective
health insurance migrated from its original source in vol-
untary organizations in civil society to becoming a shared
responsibility between these private sector organizationsand the State, with a set of state-imposed statutory re-
sponsibilities backed up by formal State regulation and
supervision [2].
During this period of growth and expansion, the individ-
uals and the range of services covered were continuously
evolving, driven by improving industrial productivity that
made possible a rising level of funding from both public
and private sources, as well as a rapidly developing level of
medical technology. Cultural norms and values also played
an important role in shaping the specific services that soli-
darity should cover. In earlier times, for example, an im-
portant component of workers mutual insurance was a
death benefit, to ensure that a covered member could af-
ford a proper Christian burial and thus not suffer the ig-
nominy of a pauper’s grave. Even in current times, social
health insurance in Germanic countries still covers cultur-
ally (but not necessarily medically) desirable “kur” or med-
ical spa treatments.
As the above observations suggest, solidarity has histor-
ically been a broadly flexible concept, adapting to and
reflecting the changing historical, economic, political and
social environment around it. In this sense, solidarity has
never been something with a fixed content or an immut-
able character. Moreover, when one considers that the
core modern meaning of solidarity – equal treatment for
all social groups (including elderly, low-income, immi-
grants, disabled) which now similarly exist in Northern
European tax-based systems defined as norms of “equity”
(UK) or “equality” (Nordic countries) – it seems clear that
this central value sitting at the core of European health
systems is not a fixed notion but rather a flexible concept
with a multi-faceted, contingent content.
Country examples of differential/variable solidarity
The wide-ranging health sector services and benefits
that compose the real-world notion of solidarity is im-
mediately apparent in the broad distribution of citizen
and service coverage that different health systems label
as “solidaristic.” This is noticeable both in the varying
groups of citizens covered by specific national social in-
surance programs, and also in the varying services and
benefits that these programs cover.
Netherlands
Concerning coverage, consider the Netherlands prior to
2006. The statutory health insurance system for regular
curative medical care (there was a separate social insur-
ance system for “exceptional” or long term care that cov-
ered 100% of the population) only covered about 63% of
all citizens [5]. Those whose income was (or grew to be)
above the ceiling threshold (32,500 Euros in 2004) were
required by law to leave the statutory system This
meant, on the one hand, that these higher-income indi-
viduals were required to seek private commercial health
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perience (eg personal health-status and family history) ra-
ther than community experience (eg collective) costs. This
could be particularly expensive for workers in their 40s
and 50s for whom a small raise in income could push
them over the income boundary into a much more expen-
sive insurance category. Moreover, forcing out higher in-
come earners meant that the “solidarity” of the statutory
system was only a solidarity of low and middle income
earners – those who earned higher incomes did not have
to (indeed could not – at least legally) participate in the
collective risk pool. Thus in pre-2006 Netherlands, soli-
darity was not universal in nature. Yet Dutch scholars
writing in this pre-2006 period regularly hailed the norma-
tive achievement created by the solidaristic dimensions of
their health insurance system [6].
It is equally instructive to consider what solidarity now
means in the Netherlands, following the 2006 health in-
surance reform [7]. In the re-structured arrangement,
100% of citizens must purchase regular medical insurance
through the statutory system (the so-called “mandate”)
from any insurance company they desire that operates in
the Netherlands [7]. So in this first respect, the post-2006
Dutch health insurance system dramatically increased
solidarity, in that all higher income citizens were for the
first time required to be in the same insurance pool as
their lower income neighbors for regular medical care
(they already were for the ABWZ for Exceptional and
Long Term Care expenses), and to cross-subsidize the
cost of coverage for lower-income citizens.
Yet the post-2006 insurance system had a new feature
that split the purchase of insurance coverage into two
linked segments (a third segment with especially challen-
ging solidarity characteristics – a no-use rebate of 255
euros, which had to be paid by covered individuals up
front - was dropped in 2008). One of the two remaining
segments in the post-2006 insurance model required
that the employer’s 50% share of the total premium cost
must continue to be channeled through a single national
state-run fund [8]. This fund would allocate a risk ad-
justed payment for each covered individual to whatever
(private not-for-profit or for-profit) insurer the individ-
ual selected. Quite differently, however, the second, indi-
vidually paid portion of the mandatory insurance
premium – labelled the “nominal premium” – was to be
used to purchase a second part of the individual’s insur-
ance policy with that same selected company, with most
individuals paying the funds directly him or herself from
his/her own private funds (some low income families re-
ceived a state-paid “healthcare allowance” until these
subsidies were cut). Moreover, to encourage bargaining
that could generate efficiencies from the private insurance
companies, individuals could reduce their premiums for
this second part of their regular medical insurance by upto 10% by banding together with other Dutch citizens to
negotiate volume discounts either via a real organization
(for example, an employee group or a patient association )
or via a virtual organization formed over the internet, typ-
ically solely for the purpose of negotiating just such a vol-
ume discount [7].
Thus, while the first part of the post-2006 regular
medical insurance considerably increased solidarity by
mandating that all citizens must join the same risk pool,
the second part of that insurance arrangement consider-
ably reduced solidarity by enabling citizens to separate
themselves into smaller market-based groupings that
could negotiate a better deal for themselves than the one
that other citizens might have. Thus the post-2006 sys-
tem both increased risk sharing in the employer paid
segment but decreased risk sharing in order to encour-
age market efficiencies in the individual-paid “nominal
premium” segment.
Moreover, in a separate part of the post-2006 regular
medical insurance, the state now pays the entire insurance
premium for all children, further muddying the solidarity
waters in that this initiative reduced costs for both higher
as well as lower income families. Overall, it is unclear
whether the post-2006 Dutch insurance plan actually did
increase solidarity as much as proponents claim.
Two additional elements of the new system further
complicate the solidarity characteristics of the Dutch
post-2006 insurance picture. The first is an additional
State bundled payments scheme for those who suffer
from what are termed “listed diseases” (eg diabetes,
chronic heart failure, COPD) [7]. These additional pay-
ments, made through the risk adjustment mechanism to
the individual’s selected insurer, are intended to compen-
sate the private insurance company for the additional
cost of that patient’s condition, and thus to relieve the
insurer of most financial risk and, one might note, to re-
lieve that individual’s fellow insurees of the need to cross-
subsidize his/her care – thus simultaneously increasing
(by paying more for sicker individuals) and reducing (by
taking financial pressure off the second “nominal pre-
mium” payments) solidarity via this extra disease-based
payment. The result of these extra payments has been -
just as the Dutch government had hoped – that individ-
uals who suffered from these listed diseases have been
welcomed by the private insurers – who indeed some-
times actually advertised for individuals with these condi-
tions to select their insurance company. This result is
exactly the reverse of the adverse selection often found in
private insurance markets, and can be considered on bal-
ance an improvement in the solidarity characteristics of
the post 2006 Dutch health insurance system.
Conversely, however, the second additional dimension
concerns the purchase of supplemental medical insur-
ance, which had been widely purchased by those with
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and which continues to be sold by private insurers in the
post-2006 arrangement. This supplemental insurance pays
for additional private services such as physiotherapy and
dental care, as well as quicker care for some outpatient
medical services [9]. Thus this second dimension of the
post-2006 system continued what had been – prior to
2006 – something that also had reduced solidarity, in that
the lowest income citizens typically could not afford to
buy it.
Germany
Moving beyond the Netherlands, a similar profile of col-
lective versus individual risk within a solidaristic health
system also can be observed in Germany’s social health
insurance system. In Germany for regular curative ser-
vices (since 1996 Germany also has a separate social in-
surance fund for long term care), a similar (although
higher) income ceiling still exists [10]. However in the
German variation, there are two important differences
from the pre-2006 approach of the Netherlands.
First, those whose income rises over the statutory ceil-
ing can, if they choose, remain in the statutory, collect-
ively based insurance system (with the interesting caveat
that, if they ever leave the statutory system, they cannot
return, even if their income should fall below the statu-
tory ceiling at some point in the future, although exemp-
tions exist for those who move from self-employed to
employed or who leave their job and are eligible through
a spouse for statutory family insurance).
Second, unlike the Netherlands, this ability of higher in-
come earners to leave the compulsory system – and thus
to break solidarity with lower income wage earners – is
still in place, as is the exemption that State civil servants
have long had to receive separate indemnity based health
insurance [11]. Interestingly, this break in solidarity based
on income has been continued despite Germany putting
in place a major health insurance reform in 2009 that cen-
tralized the collection of all health insurance premiums
into a single state-run pool that, as in the Netherlands,
then risk adjusts the amounts paid out for each covered
person to their choice of health insurance fund [12].
Thus in two of the most prominent social health in-
surance examples of countries where “solidarity” is the
widely proclaimed basis of their health system, the re-
quirement for who has (or is allowed) to share in the
collectivist insurance system, and thus how solidarity is
put into place, has long varied and indeed varies consid-
erably still in 2014.
Israel
A third country example is Israel, which, although not ter-
ritorially in Europe, has a social health insurance system
that resembles both Dutch and German arrangements.Prior to 1995, solidarity was strongly defended in Israel as
the central characteristic of each of the four social health
insurance funds. Each of these funds was a separate not-
for-profit private entity that collected premiums from its
membership and in return provided primary care, hospital
and ancillary health-related services. The largest fund,
Kupot Holim Clalit, was closely tied to the national labor
federation (Histadrut), and social health insurance premiums
were collected as a portion of each member’s labor union
dues. Yet because premiums were the same regardless of in-
come, this pre-1995 Israeli system, like most traditional
social health insurance systems, was mildly regressive.
Moreover, the pre-1995 system was not universal, as some
5% of the Israeli population, especially among Arab
Israelis, were not members of any of the four funds [13].
Thus the pre-reform arrangement had several structural
dimensions that undercut rather than reinforced solidarity.
In 1995, a new funding arrangement was introduced
for the health sector. Individuals pay a flat-rate income
tax of 3.1% on wages up to half of the average national
wage and 4.8% on income beyond that level. Income
above five times the national wage is not subject to this
health tax. There also are exemptions and discounts for
various groups such as pensioners and recipients of in-
come maintenance allowances. This health tax raised
25% of total health expenditures, and was supplemented
by general state revenues which made up some 46% of
total health sector funding [13]. All these public funds
were collected in a central national pool, which then al-
located these funds on a per capita risk adjusted basis to
whichever of the four funds a citizen chose to join. This
state-centralized, citizen-based funding model covered
all Israeli residents, improving solidarity considerably
not only among Jewish Israelis but also by incorporating
a significant number of Arab Israelis who had not been
part of the prior system [14]. While 75% of Israelis also
buy supplemental insurance (typically from their health
fund), these additional insurances are since 1998 re-
quired to be community rated so as to reduce their im-
pact on higher risk individuals and thus add a solidarity
increasing dimension to an otherwise solidarity decreas-
ing mechanism.
This new post-1996 system, however, still presents sev-
eral dilemmas regarding the level of solidarity it generated.
One dilemma is that the four funds (now called health ra-
ther than sickness funds) continue to sell supplemental in-
surance to their membership, covering additional clinical
services that are not covered by the standard tax-paid pre-
miums. While, as mentioned, some 75% of Israelis pur-
chase these supplemental policies, there is a social gap as
only 62% of lower income citizens can afford or choose to
purchase these policies [13].
The second equity-based concern was of a different
character, in that it involved what services would be
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1995 reform, this determination was to have been made
by a 70-member council, made up of representatives of
key stakeholders in the Israeli health system [14]. Among
the most difficult decisions have been those involving new
pharmaceuticals that, for cost or efficacy reasons, are ex-
cluded from the government-funded benefit package.
Major fights occurred over a new multiple sclerosis drug,
for example, which ultimately was included [15].
Eventually, decisions regarding additions to the basket of
services were delegated to a committee made up of medical
people, economists and public representatives, which re-
ceives an annual budget for this purpose. Of course, not all
possible technologies can be added due to fiscal constraints.
For example, the cancer drug Avastin was not included by
the committee for treatment of colon cancer. This rejection
produced a public hunger strike by some potential patients,
and while additional budget funding was allocated to the
committee, ultimately the drug’s exclusion from the bene-
fits package was confirmed [16]. Even when the decision
process is democratic and transparent, however, each time
a drug is excluded from the publicly funded package, there
is a reduction in solidarity with those patients who would
have benefited from its inclusion.
Israel’s experience with new drug inclusion mirrors a
similar pattern that has occurred in England, where the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence has made a
number of cost and efficacy based exclusion decisions
concerning the formulary provided by the National
Health Service which were contested by patients and, in
some cases (Herceptin) overturned by national political
decision-makers [17]. In 2013 decisions by NICE about
new drug adoptions were changed from mandatory to
advisory in nature for NHS institutions [18].
Thus in Israel as in Netherlands and Germany, an his-
torical pattern of strong but also somewhat erratic soli-
darity became more comprehensive as the result of a
recent national health reform, yet several other dimen-
sions of the reformed payment structure (eg the contin-
ued existence of supplemental health insurance and the
exclusion of certain life-extending drugs from the benefit
package) simultaneously served to reduce that new level
of solidarity.
Additional dimensions
The three case examples given here provide only the big-
picture structural dimensions of how these three social
health insurance systems differ in their practical content
from the core values assumed to inhere to solidarity. One
could deepen this picture by introducing concerns about
pensioners, the disabled, the self-employed, university stu-
dents, immigrants, and other vulnerable populations
whose care is funded under a wide variety of special and
not always normatively similar arrangements within these“solidaristic” systems [11]. One also could expand this dis-
cussion by reviewing the long history of change in ser-
vices, benefits, and different population groups, and the
differential treatment received by individual citizens in dif-
ferent geographic localities, found in the tax-funded but
solidarity based Mediterranean health systems (Italy, Spain
and Portugal) as well as in the tax-funded equity or equal-
ity based health care systems in Northern Europe includ-
ing England and the four European Nordic countries
(Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark). There are, in
sum, many different and complex dimensions in how ser-
vices and benefits have been and still are allocated within
countries whose health systems consider themselves to be
based on the core European value of solidarity.
Present-day health sector consequences of inadequate
economic growth
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis remains strong in
European health care systems. While economic growth
has begun to return to some countries in the EU, its pace
is painfully slow, and its future is not at all secure [19]. In
the Netherlands, for example, first quarter 2014 GDP fell
by 1.4%, while for the same quarter in Finland, the econ-
omy slipped back into contraction for the third time in
5 years [20]. In the UK, although the economy has begun
to grow, total annual GDP in the first quarter of 2014 is
still below what it was in 2008 [21]. Confirming continued
underperformance, on 4 November 2014 the European
Commission (the executive arm of the European Union)
cut its forecast through to 2016 for the 18 country Euro-
zone from 1.7% to 1.1% GDP growth – a level which is
just barely more than recession level [22].
This now seven-year lack of substantial growth in na-
tional economies has restricted the amount of new and
even previous funding that is available for publicly
funded health sector activities. In England, for example,
the recently installed head of the NHS, Simon Stevens,
was quoted in the Financial Times on 31 March 2014 as
saying that “the traditional model of healthcare will have
to change as the NHS faces the ‘most sustained budget
crunch in its 66-year history’” [23]. A King’s Fund report
documented that the NHS in 2015 faces a 30 billion
pound shortfall in a total budget of some 100 billion
pounds [24]. The Financial Times reported that 5 of 6
hospital trusts faces a projected fiscal shortfall in that
same NHS budget [25].
In the Netherlands, the King stated on 17 September
2013 in his speech opening the Dutch Parliament’s fall
session that the prior generous welfare state model was
no longer affordable [26]. One consequence for the
health sector in the Dutch case – as in the English as
well – is that discussions have occurred about new pa-
tient payments that might be necessary. As one example,
the rising number of elderly in need of custodial and
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tries about the possibility that more elderly middle class
patients may be required to sell their homes in order to
pay for nursing home services [27].
A further insight into the current post-recession envir-
onment of 2014 can be gleaned from current statistics
collected by the World Health Organization’s Regional
Office for Europe regarding out-of-pocket co-payments
as a percentage of total health sector finances in differ-
ent European Union countries [28]. These largely un-
solidaristic payments (although some co-payments for
drugs may be tied to age or health status) range from
5.9% in France and 9.9% in England to 20.2% in Italy,
20.3% in Spain, and 18.4% in Estonia up to 37.4% in
Latvia [28]. While all these EU health systems would
each still say that they continue to honor the European
value of solidarity in the finance of their health care sys-
tem, the range in out-of-pocket payments among these
countries currently differs by as much as seven-fold.
To be sure, there are some countries (Germany,
Sweden, Norway, Israel) where economic growth has
continued if in measured rather than robust terms. In
these countries, the health coverage debate about the
need to re-consider the content of the publicly funded
health sector package typically has had more of a future
planning than an immediate management character.
However the slow rate of underlying economic develop-
ment in developed countries since 2008 (and indeed for
two decades prior) will ultimately affect all European
health systems, as strong economic growth and the con-
sequent wealth production continues to consolidate in
Asian Rim countries not in the West [29].
Some implications for the concept of solidarity
The above discussion suggests several points about the
character of solidarity as it has been structured in the
European health sector. The first is that solidarity has
traditionally been a flexible concept, varying considerably
across countries and across historical periods in the types
of content it covers and for whom. Thus assertions that
the present level of solidarity in the health sector cannot
be altered without undermining the entire concept and
breaking faith with the citizenry do not comport with past
practice.
Similarly, the contention that governments should not
consider reductions in what services and benefits are
covered in a solidaristic system is inherently more polit-
ical than factual. This is particularly true if the financial
sustainability or even the long-term survival of existing
health systems in some countries may be at stake. As
the examples above highlight, in practice national gov-
ernments have periodically changed both the content of
their solidaristic health systems and the population
groups that have membership in these systems. Givenpast practice, then, what would be new and unusual in
the current situation would be if governments no longer
tailored their health system funding and benefit struc-
tures to the available level of public sector resources
consistent with prudent fiscal management.
To be certain, most European policymakers them-
selves do not want to reduce services and coverage, they
want to protect vulnerable groups, they want to expand
coverage for newly growing groups such as the chronic-
ally ill elderly, and there are numerous health policy ar-
guments that support those preferences [30]. However
the argument that an expansive health policy approach
is an inherent requirement of health sector solidarity as
a core European value is inconsistent with past experi-
ence. Past practice clearly indicates that governments
can and regularly do change the social contract that un-
derlies health sector solidarity, and that further changes
to that basic contract can in some circumstances be in
keeping with good governance rather than necessarily
reflecting a breach of that stewardship role [31].
This is not to argue that reductions in service coverage
or collective payment are good things that national pol-
icymakers should seek for their own sake. Rather, it is to
validate the types of changes recently seen in a number
of European health systems since the onset of the 2008
financial difficulties, and to recognize that changes that
reduce as well as expand the degree of coverage and
benefits reflect the principle of solidarity as it has been
practiced previously.
An important question can be raised about what an
appropriate new blend of mandatory social vs. supple-
mental insurances might look like in response to fiscal
stringency, and the degree to which the distribution of
specific costs and/or services between different types of
coverage might reasonably be changed. Further, as with
supplemental insurance in Israel, where governmental
regulation requires that such policies be written on a
community rating basis, future shifts in the balance of
public mandatory and supplemental insurance could po-
tentially be structured to provide more rather than less
coverage for socially vulnerable groups. The challenge
presented by ongoing economic constraints will be to
shape necessary reductions in solidarity in operational
terms in a manner that does the least harm to present
day health and social objectives of solidarity in philo-
sophical and normative terms.
A second point is that ongoing rapid developments in
the health sector including genetic decoding, personal-
ized medicine, bio-engineered pharmaceuticals, minia-
turized diagnostic and treatment methodologies, and
targeted wireless information technology will further
raise the international standard for how clinical medi-
cine will be practiced in the near future, and, in many
cases, will raise the cost of operating high quality health
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new public funds and personnel, these new clinical de-
velopments suggest that the international standard will
likely be increasing at the same time as at least some
European health systems will already be making reduc-
tions in the range and content of existing clinical ser-
vices and benefits that they provide.
These constraints on publicly funded benefit packages
will be taking place, further, not only as the international
standard of clinical care that their citizens expect to re-
ceive increases, but at a time when some public health
proponents in Europe believe there should be expensive
new commitments of public funding to support long-term
“upstream” preventive health interventions in housing,
education, transportation, and employment in order to
rectify inequities in the “social determinants of health.”
[32,33]. These competing pressures on restricted public
resources, taken together, would appear to suggest that
the operational content of solidarity between and perhaps
even within countries in Europe could continue to vary
considerably over the next period of years.
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